Your subdomains are public: certificate transparency explained
Short answer: Every time a public certificate authority issues an HTTPS certificate for one of your hostnames, it's recorded in public Certificate Transparency (CT) logs that anyone can search. That means names like staging.yourfirm.co.uk, old-crm.yourfirm.co.uk or client-portal-test.yourfirm.co.uk are effectively published the day you add a certificate. Don't rely on hostnames being secret: protect non-public sites with logins or network restrictions, choose neutral names, consider a wildcard certificate where it suits, and use CT monitoring yourself to spot certificates you didn't request.
What Certificate Transparency is
Certificate Transparency was introduced so that mistakenly or maliciously issued certificates can be spotted. RFC 6962, the original specification, describes a protocol for publicly logging the existence of TLS certificates as they are issued or observed, in a way that lets anyone audit certificate authority activity and notice suspect certificates.
The project's own explainer at certificate.transparency.dev describes the logs as append-only ledgers of certificates. Because they're distributed and independent, anyone can query them to see which certificates have been included and when. It also notes that browsers such as Chrome and Safari help enforce CT, which in practice means publicly trusted certificates are logged as a matter of routine.
Why it matters for a small business
CT is a security feature, and a good one. But it has a side effect many teams don't expect: the hostnames on your certificates become public. Search tools built on CT logs let anyone type your domain and see a list of every subdomain that has had a certificate, with dates.
What that can reveal:
- Staging and test sites, such as
dev.,staging.orbeta. - Internal tools exposed to the internet, such as
vpn.,mail.,grafana.orjenkins. - Old projects you forgot about but never switched off
- Client names, if you use them in subdomains like
acme-portal. - Upcoming launches, if you add the certificate before announcing
Attackers routinely use CT logs to find targets. A forgotten staging site with an outdated plugin and a default password is exactly what they look for.
What to do about it
1. Assume every hostname with a certificate is known. Hiding a site by giving it an obscure name doesn't work once it has a public certificate. Protect it properly:
- Put staging and admin tools behind a login, single sign-on or an IP allowlist.
- Keep them out of search engines with a noindex header as an extra layer, not as protection.
- Switch off sites you no longer use, and remove their DNS records.
2. Choose names that don't leak information. Avoid client names, product codenames or unannounced launches in hostnames. Something like preview-3.yourfirm.co.uk reveals less than bigclient-redesign.yourfirm.co.uk.
3. Consider a wildcard certificate where it fits. A certificate for *.yourfirm.co.uk appears in CT logs as the wildcard, not as each individual subdomain. That hides specific names from CT searches, though the hostnames can still be found other ways, such as DNS records or links. Wildcards also have trade-offs: one key covers many sites, so a leak affects them all, and issuing them usually requires a DNS-based validation method. Use them deliberately, not as a reflex.
4. Monitor CT for your own domain. The certificate.transparency.dev explainer notes that if you subscribe to a CT monitor for your domain, you get updates when certificates for it appear in logs. Several free and commercial services offer this. Alerts help you:
- spot certificates you didn't request, which could mean a compromised DNS account or a mis-issuance;
- see when a team member or agency spins up a new public site;
- keep an inventory of what's actually exposed.
5. Audit what's already there. Search a CT log tool for your domain today and go through the list:
| Found | Action |
|---|---|
| Live site you know about | Fine; check it's maintained |
| Staging or test site | Make sure it needs a login, or switch it off |
| Old project | Remove the site and DNS record |
| Name you don't recognise | Investigate who requested it |
Pair it with CAA records
A CAA DNS record lets you state which certificate authorities may issue certificates for your domain. CT tells you what was issued; CAA reduces who can issue in the first place. Together they make unexpected certificates rarer and easier to catch.
Agencies, contractors and many hands
Small businesses often have certificates issued by several parties: a hosting company, a website agency, an email provider, a booking platform on a subdomain. Each adds names to the logs. Keep a simple register of every subdomain, who runs it, what it's for and when it was last reviewed. When a supplier relationship ends, review their subdomains in the same week, because forgotten ones are the ones that end up running outdated software in public.
Build it into launch and shutdown checklists
When you launch a new public site, add it to the register before the certificate is issued. When you retire one, remove the site, its DNS record and its entry together. Re-run a CT search for your domain every quarter and compare it with the register; anything on the log but missing from your list deserves a closer look.
An illustrative example
A hypothetical Bristol web agency searched CT logs for its own domain and found 40 subdomains, including several client preview sites from projects finished years earlier, two still running outdated CMS versions. It switched off the old previews, moved remaining staging sites behind a single sign-on gate, adopted a naming pattern without client names, and set up a free CT monitoring alert for the domain. A month later, the alert flagged a certificate requested by a contractor for a new demo site, which the agency then put behind its login gate.
FAQ
Can I remove a certificate from CT logs?
No. Logs are append-only by design. Treat the hostname as public and protect the site.
Do internal-only certificates appear?
Certificates from your own private certificate authority aren't logged publicly. Publicly trusted ones are.
Is it a problem that competitors can see my subdomains?
Usually it's minor, but avoid revealing client names or unannounced projects.
Does this replace a security review?
No. It's one useful inventory source among several.
If you'd like a check of what your domain's certificates reveal and which old sites should be closed, send us your domain.